Transfer of influenza from contaminated FFRs to the hands of healthcare workers

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Background

- CDC recommended the use of fit tested disposable N95
 respirators for healthcare personnel who were in close contact
 with patients with suspected or confirmed 2009 H1N1 influenza.
- Filtering facepiece respirators (FFRs) are often discarded after each patient encounter.
- Hospitals reported shortages of FFRs during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic.
- The recently identified H7N9 infections in China have again raised concerns of shortages of N95 FFRs in the event of a pandemic.
- FFR reuse or extended use are two options to assist in maintaining FFR supplies, but virus transfer from contaminated FFRs to the wearer or handler is a concern.







Can FFRs serve as a fomite?

- Previously examined areas of interest.
 - How long can infectious aerosols survive on FFRs?
 - Would FFRs that incorporate antimicrobial technologies inactivate infectious aerosols?
 - Would the use of decontamination methods (UVGI, steam, bleach) allow disposable FFRs to be reused?
- Key knowledge gaps required to assess risks of handling contaminated FFRs.
 - 1. How contaminated are FFRs in the field?
 - 2. What is the transfer efficiency of virus from FFRs to the hands of the healthcare worker?







FFRs as fomites?

Fomite fo⋅mite n. –

An inanimate object or substance that is capable of transmitting infectious organisms from one individual to another.












FFR doffing and transfer of viruses

 FFR fomite hazard could be minimized with use of proper doffing techniques.











Improper FFR doffing by HCWs

- Data reported at the 2012 NIOSH NPPTL PPT Program Stakeholder Meeting indicates that many HCWs are not using proper FFR doffing techniques.
- HCWs are potentially exposed to infectious organisms when touching the contaminated surface of FFRs.





Respiratory Protection with PPE of Health Care Workers Project by Bonnie Rogers, Kathleen Buckheit, Edie Alfano-Sobsey

Respirator Use Evaluation in California Acute Care Hospitals II by Lauren Joe

http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npptl/resources/certpgmspt/meetings/03202012/PresentationsPosters03202012.html








FFR reuse and extended use

 Potential to transfer infectious agents to hands when redonning and performing user seal check









Knowledge gap 1: How contaminated are FFRs in the field?

- A simple mathematical model was developed to estimate the number of viruses trapped on the surface of the FFR
 - The model estimates FFR contamination as a function of:
 - airborne virus concentration (C_{ν}).
 - inhalation rate (IR_a) .

- time of respirator use/patient interaction (T).

- virus retention FFR (E_r) .

 $C_v \times IR_a \times T \times E_r = \text{viruses on mask}$









Model validation and estimated FFR contamination




Figure 1. Model validation. Correlation of predicted contamination with measured contamination



Breathing Head Form

Table 1. Model predicted facemask contamination based on inputs from the literature

Facemask Type	Scenario	Cv viruses/m³	IR _a m³/hr	E _r	T hr	C _a Viruses/mask
Турс	Laurenbra Santa	•				
	Low value inputs	168	0.780	0.900	0.160	19
H.	High value inputs	16,000	1.920	0.999	6.600	202,549
	Likely	12,000	1.140	0.991	0.330	4,473
S	Low value inputs	168	0.780	0.600	0.160	13
	High value inputs	16,000	1.920	0.900	6.600	182,477
	Likely	12,000	1.140	0.770	0.330	3,476









Knowledge gap 2: What is the transfer efficiency of virus from FFRs to the hands of the healthcare worker?

- Respirators contaminated with an aerosol containing Bacillus atrophaeus, a Gram+ bacterium.
- Tested transfer of bacteria from FFR to synthetic skin.











Factors that influence microbial transfer efficiency


Fomites may occur as porous or nonporous surfaces.

Porous surfaces demonstrate lower transfer rates than nonporous


surfaces.

Substrate	% transferred		
Lego	65		
Vinyl	66		
Ceramic	55		
Wood	17		
Shoulder pad	<1		
Towel	<1		
Bed sheet	<1		

Desai et al. American Journal of Infection Control April 2011













Bacteria vs. virus transfer efficiency

- Micrococcus luteus is a Gram+ bacterium.
- PRD-1 is a virus (bacteriophage).

Table 1	Results from	fomite-to-hand	transfer	(Evaluation	Period A)*
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P. RUSIN *ET AL. Journal of Applied Microbiology*, **93**, 585–592

	Mean log ₁₀ CFU or PFU		
Organism/Type of fomite	Level in/on fomite†	Level recovered from ventral surface of hands	Transfer efficiency (%)‡
Micrococcus luteus			
Laundry – 100% cotton	9.73	6·17	0.13
Laundry – 50 : 50 cotton/polyester	9.39	5.99	0.06
PRD-1			
Laundry – 100% cotton	8.73	3.63	<0.01 (0.005)
Laundry – 50 : 50 cotton/polyester	8.34	2.71	<0.01 (0.0005)







Estimation of total virus transfer from FFR to hands

Knowledge gap 1: How contaminated are FFRs in the field?

Facemask	Scenario	Cv	IR _a	E _r	T	C _a
Type		viruses/m³	m³/hr	%	hr	Viruses/mask
FFR	Likely	12,000	1.140	0.991	0.330	4,473





No significant bacteria transfer. Worst case: 1 in 1000 will transfer.

4.3 viruses transferred = $4,373 \times 0.1\%$








Estimation of virus transfer per touch

- Finger tip surface area related to FFR surface area.
- Sum of all fingertip surface areas = 3672 mm².
- For both hands the surface area of the fingertips is roughly 7.34 cm².
- The surface area of the mask is roughly 175 cm².



Tab	Table 4. Fractional Surface Area* of the Fingertip (mm²)				
Fingertip	Surface Area of Volar Part	Surface Area of Dorsal Part	Total Surface Area		
Thumb $(n = 8)$	$1070 \pm 131 (58)$	$775 \pm 41 (42)$	1845 ± 131		
Index $(n = 7)$	$666 \pm 55 (56)$	$518 \pm 55 (44)$	1183 ± 97		
Middle $(n = 6)$	$716 \pm 32 (55)$	$580 \pm 61 (45)$	1296 ± 75		
Ring $(n = 7)$	$671 \pm 62 (57)$	$513 \pm 38 (43)$	1184 ± 98		
Little $(n = 7)$	$549 \pm 64 (56)$	$423 \pm 36 (44)$	971 ± 87		
* M + CD			***		

* Mean ± SD.

0.18 virus/ touch ≈ 4373 viruses × 0.1% × (7.34 cm²/175 cm²)







Other factors to consider for risk analysis when handling contaminated FFRs

- Transfer efficiency of virus from fingertips through points of entry (mouth, nose, eyes) and to points of infection.
- Virus infectivity.







Conclusions

- FFRs could become contaminated with significant amounts of viruses even during short patient encounters (for instance, especially during flu season)
- Based on the model very little contamination should get transferred to hands.







Chief Limitations

- "All models are wrong, but some are useful." -Statistician George Box.
- The model may overestimate the transfer of virus to hands of the wearer
 - Model transfer efficiency for FFRs was conducted using a bacterium and not a virus.
 - Assumes all viruses are infectious.
- Direct cough or sneeze contamination of an FFR, which may increase the virus count, was not considered.
- Others







Current and future studies

- Why Hospital Staff Catch the Flu: Assessing modes of transmission
 - During the 2012/13 influenza season we collected aerosol samples from patient care rooms and surgical masks worn by HCWs within those rooms to determine the level of aerosol and SM contamination.
 - Conduct studies to determine the transfer efficiency of virus (bacteriophage MS2), from contaminated FFRs to the hands of test subjects FY14.







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